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Is India Shining?  
 
Anurag Banerjee1 and Nilanjan Banik2 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the popular perception about economic reforms having benefitted only the 
richer districts between 1999/2000 and 2004/2005. Using the spatial dynamics of district-
level per-capita income we found that income distribution did not change between the 
years examined. We argue that this is because of per-capita income across districts being 
spatially positively correlated. We identify physical infrastructure, human capital, and 
factories, as factors responsible for increase in income for both the rich as well as the 
poor districts. Infrastructure, physical or social, is a key component of growth in India. A 
policy impact analysis shows development of better drainage and potable water systems 
has a large impact on income. For the year 2001/02, we find that for every 1 per cent 
increase in closed drainage system and potable water, district-level median income 
increases by 1.39 per cent and 0.21 per cent, respectively.  
Key Words: Districts of India, Income, Neighbourhood effect, Spatial Analysis 
JEL Classification: C31, R12 
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1. Introduction 
In 2004, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government came to power 
after defeating the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government. This 
defeat for the NDA government came in spite of the fact that Indian economy was 
growing fast, at 8.5 per cent in 2003/2004. A popular perception explaining the ousting of 
the then ruling NDA government lay in its inability to check rise in regional income 
inequality. How true then, is this perception about economic reforms enhancing regional 
income disparity? We answer this question by studying the dynamics of income 
distributional pattern in India. If reforms are favouring rich-income districts then we 
would see the emergence of twin peaks in the underlying income distribution function: 
clustering of the rich-income district, and clustering of the poor-income district with 
pockets of economic growth pulling-up the national average income. On the other hand, a 
uniform growth process at a pan-India level would lead to a disappearance of such 
clusters. Considering district-level per-capita income data from the Planning 
Commission, Government of India, in 1999/2000 and 2004/2005, we find that the income 
distribution has not changed, thus the perception about economic reforms having 
benefitted only the rich-income district is not supported by the data. Results suggest that 
between 1999/2000 and 2004/2005 there was no statistically significant difference in the 
median adjusted income distribution functions. In fact, the income density function for 
2004/2005 has become more platykurtic (with fewer extreme values) than it was during 
1999/2000, suggesting that there has been a reduction in inter-district per-capita income 
disparity.  
This idea is in concurrence of Quah (1993, 1996), and Jones (1997),who 
introduce the notion of twin peaks in the cross-country distribution of incomes. Quah 
(1993, 1996) found evidence about persistence, and stratification of income density 
functions.3 Jones (1997) observed that clustering can be a temporary phenomenon, as 
may happen with high frequency growth miracles data. Emergence of twin peaks implies 
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 Quah (1993) consider log of per-capita income data for 118 countries between 1962 and 1985. Although 
our analysis contains data for a short span, we argue that given India’s fast growth experience within this 
short span (average annual growth rate exceeding 6 per cent between 1999 and 2005) might make it 
possible to capture emergence of any cluster in the underlying income distribution function, especially, at a 
sub-regional level.  
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polarization of the cross-country income distribution into rich and poor convergence 
clubs. 
As there has been no evidence in favour of change in the underlying income 
distribution in spite of the fact that median level of income has increased, we endeavour 
to investigate why this has happened, and the factors (as captured through development, 
and other policy indicators) responsible. In the process of analyzing the interaction 
between income and policy variables affecting income, such as education, health, and 
other development indicators, we separate out, and quantify the direct (own) effect, the 
direct neighbourhood effect and indirect neighbourhood effect. A direct effect reflects 
how the level of development (captured through development indicators) in any 
particular district i affects its own income. Direct neighbourhood effect captures how the 
level of development in any neighbouring district (say, j) affects the income level of 
district i. The indirect neighbourhood effects captures how the increase in income in 
neighbouring district j affects income in district i.  
We find that opportunities to earn income (measured in terms of district-level per-
capita income) in the neighbouring districts positively affect income in district i.4 The 
indirect neighbourhood effect results in spillovers of income from one district to the 
other, thereby resulting in concurrent movement in per-capita income across districts. 
The Indian constitution guarantees free movement of labour and capital across districts in 
India, thereby, guaranteeing a more balanced spatial distribution of income. In general, 
development indicators, such as physical and social infrastructure including, electricity, 
hospitals, closed drainage system, drinking water, and banks positively affect income of 
any particular region; thereby implying infrastructure, physical or social, is a key 
component of growth. 
To our knowledge this study is the first scientific attempt that makes use of 
district-level data from India, and quantifies the neighbourhood effect using spatial 
econometric techniques. 
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 Economies of neighbouring districts are interdependent. This can  happen through economic agents such 
as firms located in different districts trading among themselves; or through peer-group effects where 
externalities in local labor market due to production, matching, and other market interaction involve 
movement of labors from one district to another; and even through network externalities of infrastructure.  
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2. Earlier studies 
Whether economic reforms in India has widened the gap between the richer and the 
poorer states, the evidence is mixed. While examining the growth performance of 14 
major states during the pre-reform period (from 1980/81 to 1990/91) with the post-reform 
period (from 1991/92 to 1998/99), Ahluwalia (2002), finds that not all the rich states have 
become richer relative to the poorer states. Except for Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa, all 
other states have narrowed the distance between themselves and two of the richest states 
(Punjab and Haryana) during the nineties. Middle-income states such as Karnataka, 
Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, actually grew faster during the post-reform period 
relative to their growth rates during the pre-reform periods. Ahluwalia (2013) reinforces 
this finding where he finds evidence about growth rates of the erstwhile BIMARU states 
comprising of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh are converging with 
the national average more than what has been reported in his 2003 paper. Ahluwalia 
(2002, 2013) finds private sector investment, physical infrastructure (such as irrigation 
facilities, electrification, roads, ports and rail transportation), and literacy rates as factors 
responsible for variation in state-level income.  
Bhattacharya and Sakthivel (2004) on the other hand find evidence in favour of 
increase in regional inequality, with the state domestic product (SDP) widening more 
drastically during the post-reform period. Arguing that the comparison in Ahluwalia 
(2002) is based on two different sets of SDP data, 5 Bhattacharya and Sakthivel (2004) 
extend the new SDP data series backward to compare growth and regional variation 
across states with a common database. They find the coefficient of variation in the per-
capita SDP growth rate has increased from 0.19 during the eighties to 0.29 during the 
nineties. This paper finds that higher population growth rate is responsible for slower 
SDP growth rate in poorer states such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The paper by Barua 
and Chakraborty (2010) also find evidence in favor of widening interregional income 
inequality during post-1991 reform period. The authors attribute the cause of cross 
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 The new 1993/94 base year SDP data series used for doing post-reform period analysis is different than 
the old 1980/81 base year SDP data series used for analyzing performance of states during pre -reform 
period. There has been a change in product classification in the new SDP data series, with more sectors 
included from the financial services, the real estate and the agricultural allied services, than there are in the 
old SDP data series (See, Bhattacharya and Sakthivel, 2004). 
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regional inequalities to disproportionate growth of manufacturing activities across region. 
They found trade openness is the key factor determining the manufacturing share in 
income across the regions. 
Our study fits well to this strand of literature. We also address the limitation of 
earlier studies in our analysis. First, we use district-level data to capture spatial variation 
in income and development indicators that are observed at a sub-state level. Second, we 
use this district-level per-capita income data to examine the dynamics of the income 
distribution function. We do this to analyze whether during the post-reform period (that 
is, between 1999/2000 and 2004/2005) there has been any statistically significant change 
in the district-level income density function. Finally, to capture the potential for 
observational interaction across region, such as through technological spillovers, or 
through good governance, we model the neighbourhood effect. This is because, a 
regression based approach (cross section, time series, or panel) typically does not capture 
the neighbourhood effect, and failure to capture neighbourhood effect can result in major 
model misspecification (Anselin, 1988).6   
 
3. Empirical model  
The empirical analysis has three parts.  
In the first part of the analysis we see how per-capita district-level income 
distribution (absolute, and median (relative) adjusted) has changed between 1999/2000 
and 2004/2005; and between 2001/02 and 2004/2005. To examine the dynamics, we draw 
density of district per-capita income for the fiscal years, 1999/2000, and 2004/2005. To 
check for the robustness we repeat this exercise for the time period between 2001/2002 
and 2004/2005. We ran Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to ascertain whether there is any 
statistically significant difference in the median adjusted per-capita income distribution 
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 Even the attempt to control for regional variation using b inary dummy variables, as is often done in 
regression, might not yield satisfactory results in terms of capturing intricate geographical relationship. For 
instance, Gautam Budh Nagar (one of the more progressive district in the State of Uttar Pradesh) can be 
treated as one of the richest districts in the country despite being part of Uttar Pradesh, which is classified 
as a poor state. Using district dummy for this region will fail to capture how elements of prosperity 
gradually spread from the core (say, Noida, the district headquarter of Gautam Budh Nagar) to the rest of 
Uttar Pradesh. 
 6 
between different fiscal years: from 1999/2000 to 2004/2005, and from 2001/2002 to 
2004/2005.  For a given cumulative density function F(X) the KS statistic is given as: 
)()(sup '' ,2,1, xFxFD nn
x
nn
 , where 
x
sup is the supremum of the set of distances 
given by ',nnD . A statistically significant difference in median adjusted per-capita income 
distribution (that is, ',nnD  not approaching zero) indicates that income disparity among 
districts has increased between two different time periods. To visually inspect formation 
of twin peaks (if any), we compute the density estimates using the Epanechnikov kernel 
with a bandwith chosen for optimizing normal densities.7  
The second part of our analysis is a follow-up from the first part. We ask the 
question: What are the factors that may have led to an increase in per-capita district 
income in India, with or without any change, in the underlying income distribution 
function? In particular, we consider the following spatial income level model:  
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where 1Y and 2Y are the 1n vector of cross sectional observations on the log of district 
level per-capita income for the fiscal 2001/2002 and 2004/2005, respectively. 0X  is a 
matrix of development indicators data that are mostly obtained from the 2001 Census 
(Government of India, 2001).8 The coefficients βs measure the direct (own) effect. The 
coefficients γs capture the direct neighbourhood effects. And, the coefficients  s capture 
the indirect neighbourhood effects. A negative γ implies spillover effects from the 
development indicators in neighbouring district j have detrimental effect on the income of 
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 Compared to other kernels (Gaussian, Uniform, Triangular, and Bi-weight), Epanechnikov kernel 
minimizes the asymptotic mean integrated square error, and hence is chosen for this analysis. 
8
 It is to be noted that Census of India 2001 was conducted in two phases. Information related to the 
development indicators were collected during April and September, 2000. Hence, our model does not have 
any endogeneity problem.  
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district i. A positive γ implies otherwise. For instance, it is expected that districts in the 
neighbourhood of big cities will enjoy some positive externalities and hence will tend to 
have a higher income as compared to districts located further away. Gautam Budh Nagar 
(a district bordering Delhi), and Gurgaon (a district in Haryana in the neighbourhood of 
Delhi) are expected to have a positive γ. It is also possible that being in the 
neighbourhood of a highly developed district can suffer from negative externality due to 
moving away of productive resources to the more developed districts, therefore a 
negative γ.  
To capture the neighbourhood effect we take into account geographical location 
of each district and its neighbouring districts, and build an adjacency matrix W. We 
define W such that 1ijW , if district i is adjacent to district j, and zero otherwise (for 
districts that are not adjacent). Spatial relations may exist because of the geographical 
proximity among the districts or because of the proximity evolving through 
economic/business relations. Geographical proximity is exogenous in nature whereas 
proximity arising out of economic relation is not. Because of endogenity problem that 
may arise from business relation, we use geographical proximity and not economic 
proximity, to construct our adjacency matrix. 
Before performing our regression we do some pre-testing using Moran Index (I), 
to see whether this W matrix captures the spillover effect. We find that Moran I for 
1999/2000 and 2001/2002 are significant at 1 per cent level.9 It shows that spatial 
correlation between incomes is statistically significant. Failing to capture such spatial 
correlations in a regression setting will result in biased estimates. 
Thus we model the residual errors as spatially autocorrelated errors that is, any 
positive or negative shock in any specific district, is likely to affect the neighbouring 
districts. The extent of spatial correlation is captured through 1  and 2 . The total spatial 
multiplier at time period 1, that is, for the year 2001/2002, can be derived from:  
)4(
)3(
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110101
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Plugging (4) in (3) yields: 
                                                 
9
 Moran I for 1999/2000 is 0.54, and for 2001/02 is 0.53. It implies in 1999/2000, 54 per cent of the income 
in district i is influenced by incomes in the neighbouring districts (See, Table 1). 
 8 
   11110101

 WIuWXXY   
That is, 



1
1110101
k
kkWuWXXY   
Here,   11

 WI  is the spatial multiplier in period 1. W1 is the spatial correlation 
between neighbouring districts, say district i with its neighbouring district h . 221W is the 
spatial correlation with one degree of separation, that is, spatial correlation between 
district h and district j , with district i lying between district h and district j . Similarly, 
33
1W is the spatial correlation with two degrees of separation between the districts, and 
so on and so forth. This is analogous to AR (1) type specification in time series where 
information about time periods, t, t-1, t-2, etc. comes from   1 LI  , where, L is the lag 
operator. The cross equation correlation coefficient between income in 2001/2002 and 
2004/2005 is given by ψ. As we are considering a system of equations, we use Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) to generate efficient estimates. The estimation of the model 
is done by the method introduced by Kelejian and Prucha (2004).  
 In the third section, we do a policy exercise by analyzing the effects on the spatial 
income distribution because of changes in policy variables such as school enrollment 
(proxy for human capital); banks, electricity, closed drainage system, and drinking water 
(proxy for social and physical infrastructure); and factories (proxy for investment in 
productive capacity and opportunities to earn income).  
 
4. Data, and the results 
The data on district-level per-capita income is taken from Planning Commission, 
Government of India. We include districts from 29 states and 6 union territories in India. 
We consider the time period between 1999/2000 and 2004/2005, and between 2001/2002 
and 2004/2005. Data for the years after 2004/2005 are not available for all the districts, 
resulting in significant drop in the number of observations.10 Also many districts are 
newly formed, and information about per-capita income for them is not available for the 
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 Planning Commission does not report data on district-level per-capita income data for the period after 
2006/07. 
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earlier years. 11 Therefore, to maintain uniformity, and to get a more robust result, we 
consider the aforementioned time period. For the fiscal 1999/2000 an important omission 
in the Planning Commission data is district-level income for the State of Gujarat, and 
Delhi. During 1999/2000, we have 508 data points (out of 585 districts) in India. For the 
latter fiscal years (2000/2001, and 2004/05), we have data points covering 536 districts. 
This increase in number of observation is due to the inclusion of per-capita district 
income data from Gujarat and Delhi, which are not available for 1999/2000. The per-
capita district income data for Gujarat and Delhi are taken from Indicus Analytics, 
Delhi.12 Data relating to the development indicators are mostly taken from the 2001 
Census (Government of India, 2001). These development indicators are: number of 
factories per 1 lakh population, percentage of households using electricity as a source of 
light, percentage of households with closed drainage system in their neighbourhood, 
school enrolment as a percentage of total population, number of hospitals and 
dispensaries per 1 lakh population, percentage of households availing banking service, 
and percentage of households with tap drinking water within the household premise. The 
data on number of murders by use of fire arms for the year 1999 in each district was 
collected from National Crime Record Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of 
India. We have calculated the gini coefficient data from the Lorenz ratio obtained from 
Chaudhuri and Gupta (2009). To merge the data suitably across indicators missing 
observations for certain districts are dropped from the final data set. In total we have 485 
observations. For 51 districts we do not have complete information for all the 
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In 2000 there are 585 districts, and in 2011 there are 627 districts in India. Many of these districts are 
newly formed, and for some of them information about the income variable is not available. The case in 
point is Delhi. The Census 2001 contains information about many variables related to north, north -east, 
north-west, south, south-west, west, east, and central Delhi. However during 2001, when it comes to per-
capita income we find information only relating to Delhi as a whole, and not its constituent districts. 
Source: Planning Commission, Government of India<http://districts.nic.in/dstats.aspx>. Accessed 
(02/04/2011). 
12
 Indicus Analytics collect data from the Central Statistical Organization (CSO), Ministry of Statistics and 
Programme Implementation, Government of India. CSO collate data from respective state governments. 
Planning Commission database also uses the CSO database. Therefore introducing per-capita district-level 
income data for Gujarat and Delhi for 2001/02 and 2004/05 is not going to affect (bias) our results.   
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development indicators, and we drop them from the final data set. The results are 
generated using MATLAB.   
 
Results    
We find some interesting results. We do not find evidence in support of twin 
peaks: clustering of the rich income districts, and clustering of low income districts, 
across India. There has been uniform increase in income among all the districts.   
(TABLE 1) 
We notice from Table 1 that there is an increase in the mean and in the median 
per-capita district income. We also notice that there is an increase in standard deviation, 
skewness, and kurtosis measures of income. In fact, as kurtosis has become very high 
during the latter period, that is, during 2004/2005, the assumption of normality might not 
be valid. So we use the non-parametric sign test to test for the increase in income across 
different time periods. The results in Table 2 show that there is a significant increase in 
the mean and median per-capita district-level income between 1999/2000, and 
2004/2005, as well as between 2001/2002 and 2004/2005. Since the income distribution 
is skewed as well has a high kurtosis (evident from Table 1), we perform the same set of 
tests for the log per-capita income. Here also, we get similar results, indicating that there 
is an overall increase in the level of income. 
(TABLE 2) 
Since there has been an increase in the mean and the median per-capita income, 
does it indicate that districts with high per-capita income have become well-off relative to 
the districts with low per-capita income? In other words, do we find any evidence in 
favour of cluster or divergence of income between the richer and the poorer districts? To 
analyze this we plot income density function for 1999/2000, 2001/2002 and 2004/05, in 
Figure 1.  
We observe through considering districts’ income data there is definitely no 
evidence about emergence of twin peaks in any of these periods. There is a shift in the 
per-capita income density function during these time periods. This is due to a significant 
increase in the mean, and the median per-capita income, from 1999/2000 to 2004/05.  
(FIGURE 1, here) 
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The income distribution functions also show evidence about first-order stochastic 
dominance: Income distribution function for 2004/05 lies everywhere below (that is, to 
the right of) income distribution drawn for 2001/02.13 Similarly, income distribution for 
2001/02 lies to the right of income distribution drawn for 1999/2000. This implies that 
between 1999/2000 and 2004/05, poverty has fallen. This result is not surprising. It is 
widely documented that when economic growth happens absolute poverty falls. 14 What 
is more interesting is to examine whether among districts there is any significant change 
in the median adjusted per-capita (log) income distribution function between 1999/2000 
and 2004/05, and between 2001/02 and 2004/05? This is relevant, especially, because we 
observe income density function for 2004/05 had become more platykurtic (with fewer 
extreme values) than it was during 1999/2000.15 We ran KS test to ascertain this (See, the 
addendum in Table 2).   
Results suggest that between 2001/02 and 2004/05 there is no statistically 
significant difference in the median adjusted income distribution functions. This result is 
true whether we consider log of income, or income without log. Considering level 
income, we arrive at a similar conclusion, that is, the income distribution function has not 
changed between 1999/2000 and 2004/05.16 In fact, a glance at the median adjusted per-
capita income densities drawn for 1999/2000, 2000/01, and 2004/05, suggest that these 
distribution functions are more or less similar (Figure 1). The data suggests that both the 
rich and poor districts have equally become well-off. There has been a reduction in 
absolute levels of income poverty among districts.  
Next we examine the common externalities of income processes, if any, across 
geographical boundaries. Put differently, we want to find out the channel through which 
growth is translating to development, and vice versa. To select the appropriate variables 
we take note of various growth models (such as Solow growth model, endogenous 
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 An income distribution function stochastically dominates another if the percentage of people be low any 
given income is higher in the first (1999/2000) than in the second (2004/05). The income distribution 
function that stochastically dominates the other also has higher poverty than the other.   
14
 For an excellent discussion on this topic, see, Fields (2001), pp.102-104. 
15
 We do not find evidence suggesting that there has been a statistical significant increase in standard 
deviation. 
16
 However, when we consider income without log we find a change in income distribution function at a 5 
per cent level, between 1999/2000 and 2004/05.  
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growth models, or models dealing with micro-foundation of macroeconomics like 
rational expectation type models), and existing literature on India’s income and 
development dynamics.  
For instance, we consider gini coefficient on the basis of the study by Tendulkar 
(2010). He admits that there has been a rise in summary measures of relative inequality 
(gini coefficients) during the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-12). Similarly, following 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1982), and Rosenzweig (1990), we choose number of hospitals, 
water and sanitation infrastructure, and school enrollment, respectively, as these variables 
have significant effect on growth and development indicators of a region. Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin (1982) find child mortality in India falls in the presence of more clinics per-
capita, and in the presence of a better water and sanitation infrastructure (such as closed 
drainage system). Rosenzweig (1990) finds that higher male wages have a positive 
income effect on schooling, and raise school enrollment.  
As a proxy for access to finance, we choose bank branch, and as a proxy for 
governance and institution, we choose numbers of murder. Burgess and Pandey (2004) 
finds that the rural bank branch expansion program in India has a significant effect in 
terms of reducing rural poverty and in increasing non-agricultural output. Kochar et al. 
(2006), finds that states with weaker institutions and poorer infrastructure have 
experienced lower GDP, and lower industrial growth. Menon and Sanyal (2007) find that 
labor unrest, credit constraints, and indicator of state’s economic health influence 
location decision of foreign firms investing in India. We take total murder as a proxy for 
governance. 
Finally, Aiyar (2001), Ahluwalia (2002), and Purfield (2006) find, investment in 
productive capacity (especially, private sector investment) is an important factor 
explaining the variation in state-level income. We include the number of factories per one 
lakh population as an explanatory variable as a proxy for productive capacity.     
Therefore, the independent variables17 that we consider for our study are gini 
coefficient (proxy for income inequality); school enrollment (proxy for human capital); 
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 One limitation of the data is failure to capture the quality issue for the services that are provided. For 
example, there are issues relating to teacher absenteeism, quality of drinking water, healthcare services, etc. 
Modeling this quality aspect requires experiment such as randomized controlled trial – something outside 
the scope of this paper. 
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banks, electricity, closed drainage system, drinking water, and hospitals (proxy for social 
and physical infrastructure); factories (proxy for investment in productive capacity and 
opportunities to earn income), and murder (proxy for governance). Our dependent 
variable is log of per-capita income for 2001/02, and 2004/05. All these data are at a 
district level. 
(TABLE 3) 
Our findings suggest that with the exception of total murder (proxy governance); 
direct effects of the development variables are statistically significant and are of expected 
signs. The significant gini coefficient indicates that for any district income inequality is 
good for income generation. The ongoing reform process cannot be blamed entirely for 
this occurrence. Reforms encourage more active market participation and hence will not 
guarantee equal returns to all. While returns to skilled labour are going to increase (due to 
scarcity in number), unskilled labour will be left out unless necessary skills are developed 
by that group. However, as the KS test in the earlier section indicates, income inequality 
within any given district is not contributing to divergence in median income across 
districts, or regional income inequality. Both the coefficients on factories and school 
enrollment are positive, and statistically significant, indicating that these factors 
positively affect income. Similarly, better physical and social infrastructure such as 
electricity, hospitals, closed drainage system, drinking water, and banks, help business to 
grow in any particular region. This in turn creates opportunities to earn more income. The 
coefficient on murder rate is statistically not significant. This may be because of poor 
conviction rate in India.18 Infrastructure, physical or social, is a key component that 
affects income, positively. 
 While analyzing the direct neighbourhood effect we find the coefficients on 
factories and electricity are significantly positive, whereas, the coefficient on bank is 
significantly negative. There is a positive influence on income in district i (captured as W 
× Number of factories total) if there are more factories in the neighbouring districts. 
Similarly, better electricity, by facilitating growth of factories in the neighbouring 
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 Between 2005 and 2009 the average conviction rate for murder is only 36.2 per cent. Out of nearly 1.27 
hundred thousands murder only 44601 people were convicted. See, Times of India News Service. Available 
at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Conviction-rates-for-murder-bysmal/art icleshow/8720229.cms.  
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districts may contribute positively towards district i’s income. This result is similar to that 
of Ahluwalia (2002), where he finds private sector investment in productive capacities 
such as factories, and in social (such as human capital) and physical infrastructure (such 
as ports, airports, national highways, telecommunication, etc.), positively affect state-
level income. 
A negative neighbourhood coefficient in the banking variable (captured as W × 
banking service) implies banks in the neighbouring districts can lure away productive 
investment from district i, and hence adversely affect its income. Alternatively, bank 
lending money in the neighbouring districts, will have less money to lend in district i, 
thereby contributing negatively to income. De and Vij (2012) find a negative 
neighbourhood coefficient for the banking variable while examining response of 
commercial banks in giving loans to the drought prone districts in India.  
The coefficients ρ1 and ρ2, capturing the indirect neighbourhood effect, are 
significantly positive with values, 0.096 and 0.094, respectively. It means that the 
spillover effect of income is around 10 per cent: if income in district i increase by 100 per 
cent, income in the neighbouring district j increases by 10 per cent. In accordance to our 
expectation about persistence in income across time we find a high cross-equation 
income correlation ( ). Income across both the time periods, 2001/02 and 2004/05, are 
highly correlated (  = 0.91). F-test statistics confirmed no change in structural 
coefficients. We accept the hypothesis: 21   and 21   . High cross-equation income 
correlation also implies that the districts with higher per-capita income will continue to 
perform better. However, as is evident from the KS test results in the earlier section, a 
higher cross-equation income correlation does not automatically imply an increase in 
income disparity between the richer and poorer districts, something suggested by 
Bhattacharya and Sakthivel (2004) in their state-level analysis. Although it might sounds 
slightly presumptuous, we believe that the private sector (without depending too much on 
the government) is taking lead in moving capital and labour to areas with lesser input 
costs (that is, investing more in backward districts), thus contributing to uniform growth 
process in India.  
Policy analysis 
We do a policy exercise to quantify percentage change in income variable 
resulting from one percentage change in policy covariates. This policy exercise is done 
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for 2001/2002. Since the F-test of equality of structural parameters did not show any 
changes between 2001/2002 and 2004/05 we get similar result when we undertake this 
policy exercise for 2004/2005. 
(TABLE 4) 
For instance, for the district Bangalore Urban, every one per cent increase in the 
number of factories will increase income in Bangalore Urban by 0.18 per cent. Likewise, 
one percentage point increase in electrification, closed drainage, school enrollment, 
banks, and drinking water, increases per-capita income in Bangalore Urban by 0.30 per 
cent, 0.41 per cent, 0.25 per cent, 0.17 per cent, and 0.27 per cent, respectively. We also 
compute the spillover effect for the neighbouring districts. One per cent increase in 
number of factories in Bangalore urban increases per-capita income in neighbouring 
Dharmapuri district by 0.03 percentage points. Similarly, for the neigbouring Bangalore 
Rural, Chamarajanagar, and Kolar districts, one per cent increase in number of factories 
in Bangalore urban raises income in these districts by 0.03 per cent, 0.01 per cent, and 
0.01 per cent, respectively. Likewise, one percentage point increase in electrification, 
closed drainage, school enrollment, banks, and drinking water, in Bangalore Urban, 
increases income in Dharmapuri district by 0.06 per cent, 0.09 per cent, -0.07 per cent, -
0.02 per cent, and 0.01 per cent, respectively. Having more schools and banks although 
helps generate more income in Bangalore Urban also adversely affects income earning 
potential for the neighbouring districts. This may happen because the bank lending 
money in Bangalore Urban may have less money to lend to the neighbouring districts – 
something that we have stated earlier while analyzing our results from SUR model. 
Likewise, more schools in Bangalore Urban may attract more talent from neighbouring 
districts, and therefore adversely affect supply of skilled labour in the neighbouring 
districts.  
(FIGURE 2.1 and FIGURE 2.2) 
We visually compare the spillover effects of these different policy variables at a 
pan-India level for the year 2001/02. Closed drainage system has the maximum impact 
(See, Figure 2.1) on income through own and spillover effects. For one per cent increase 
in closed drainage system, income increase between 0.96 per cent and 2.58 per cent. The 
second biggest factor is the availability of potable water. A one per cent increase in 
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availability of tap water systems within households, increase income between 0.16 and 
1.30 per cent (See, Figure 2.2).  
Given the positive impact of closed drainage (sanitation) and potable water on 
income, from the policy perspective it would be interesting to analyze the own effect, 
direct neighborhood effect and indirect neighborhood effect of these two important policy 
covariates. For the year 2001/02, we find that for every 1 per cent increase in closed 
drainage system, district-level median income increases by 1.39 per cent. This is the own 
effect. The direct neighborhood effect is 0.59, that is, for 1 per cent increase in closed 
drainage system in the neighboring district (say, j), median income of district i increases 
by 0.59 per cent. Similarly, because of increase in median income in neighboring district 
j (made possible through better closed drainage system), median income of district i 
increase by 0.79 per cent – the indirect neighborhood effect. The own effect of closed 
drainage system on 95th percentile and 5th percentile income cohorts are 1.96 and 0.68, 
respectively. For the year 2001/02, the own, direct, and indirect neighborhood effect, of 
potable water on median income are 0.21, 0.09, and 0.12, respectively. The own effect of 
potable water on 95th percentile and 5th percentile income cohorts are 0.39 and 0.16, 
respectively. We get similar results for the fiscal 2004/05.       
(TABLE 5, here) 
Many districts in India do not have a proper drainage system and lack drinking 
water. Poor drainage systems usually have stagnated water thereby becoming a breeding 
place for mosquitoes. This could result in increase of malaria and water related disease in 
the vicinity, adversely affecting income. Similarly, proper potable drinking water systems 
have positive public health outcomes. If people are healthy, they can work harder and 
assimilate knowledge more efficiently which translates to higher productivity and income 
growth (Grossman, 1972).  
Among  other policy variables investigated, banking services, school enrolment, 
factories, and electrification, increases income by  0.01 to 0.25 per cent, -0.57 to 0.14 per 
cent, 0.24 to 0.60 per cent, and 0.10 to 0.75 per cent, respectively. 19 
5. Conclusion 
This paper finds that during the post-reform period, India has not only managed to grow 
fast but has also performed well in terms of providing quality life (measured in terms of 
                                                 
19
 Figures of these results are available on from the authors at http://www.dur.ac.uk/a.n.banerjee/ 
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per-capita income) to its citizens. Working with district-level data for the periods 
between 1999/2000 and 2004/2005, our results suggest no divergence in income across 
districts in India. The income dynamics provide no evidence in support of the twin peaks 
hypothesis: clustering of the rich and poor income districts at a pan-India level. Income 
growth has been spatially correlated through social and physical infrastructures as well as 
indirectly though income spillovers. This analysis about dynamics of per-capita income 
shows development indicators such as infrastructure as an important component for 
income generation.  
Consequently income generation and infrastructure development in one district 
aids in income generation in others in the neighbourhood. This leads to a reduction in 
income disparity among districts.  
Finally, a comparative static policy analysis shows that public expenditure in 
development in closed drainage systems has the most impact on income generation, 
possibly though greater public health outcomes. 
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Table 1: Per-capita income summary statistics (in 1999 Rupees) 
 1999/00  2001/02  2004/05  
 
 Mean 15512.3 16882.7 19600.8 
 Median 14029.5 15154.5 17084.5 
 Standard 
Deviation 7660.9 9126.5 12093.4 
 Skewness 1.5 2.0 3.0 
 Kurtosis 7.3 12.1 23.3 
Addendum Statistics Moran Index (I) t-statistics 
Per-capita income 1999/2000 0.54 19.74 
Per-capita income 2001/02 0.53 20.33 
Per-capita income 2004/05 0.48 18.51 
Per-capita annualized income growth 
1999/00-2004/05 0.38 13.88 
Per-capita annualized income growth 
2000/01-2004/05 0.38 10.05 
 
Table 2: Tests for significance in mean and variance of Income   
 1999/00 and  
2004/05 
(without Gujarat and 
Delhi) 
2001/02 and 
2004/05 
 
T-test of  Mean Difference: Income 19.41 (0.00)
a 
23.22 (0.00) 
16.08 (0.00) 
22.11 (0.00) T-test of  Mean Difference: Log  Income 
Z-Value of  sign test of median: Income 6.87  (0.00) 
6.78 (0.00) 
4.98 (0.00) 
4.99 (0.00) Z-Value of  sign test of median: Log Income 
Addendum Table: Test for difference in distribution function 1999/00 and 2004/05 
(without Gujarat and 
Delhi) 
2001/02 and 
2004/05 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) one sided test statistics (median 
adjusted log income) 
0.042 (0.38)
 
0.036 (0.48) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) one sided test statistics (median 
adjusted income in level form) 
0.084(0.02) 0.061 (0.11) 
a 
P-values are in the parenthesis  
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Table 3: SUR Estimates of Income Distribution. 
 
                                                                                     Equation 1                                                    Equation 2 
                                                                               Dependent Variable                                   Dependent Variable                                                             
                                                                                Log income 2004/05                                  Log income 2001/02                     
System R-square    
 
0.553 
 
Cross-equation correlations ( ) 0.919 
R-bar Square 0.679 0.685 
No. observations, No. Variables  485,    19 485,    19 
Independent Variables (2001 Census) Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Constant 8.3647
** 
86.48 8.2919
**
 93.94 
No. of factories total 0.0004
* 
2.38 0.0004
*
 2.44 
Gini coefficientª  0.6409
* 
2.31 0.6116
*
 2.42 
Murder
b
  0.0003
 
0.76 0.0003 0.98 
Electricity connection 0.003
* 
2.28 0.0031
*
 2.54 
Closed drainage  0.0057
** 
2.95 0.0044
*
 2.52 
School enrolment  0.009
** 
3.72 0.0085
**
 3.83 
Hospitals and dispensaries  0.0034
** 
3.65 0.0031
**
 3.67 
Banking services  0.0064
** 
2.92 0.0062
**
 3.12 
Tap drinking water  0.0029
** 
2.81 0.0023
*
 2.41 
!  
W*No. of factories total
 
0.0002
** 
4.37 0.0002
**
 3.18 
W*Gini coefficient  0.108 1.20 0.1064 1.30 
W*Murder  0 -0.23 0 0.29 
W*Electricity connection 0.0004 1.16 0.0008
**
 2.63 
W*HH closed drainage  0.0003 0.40 -0.0002 -0.27 
W*School enrolment  -0.0002 -0.40 -0.0002 -0.38 
W*Hospitals and dispensaries  -0.0003 -0.80 -0.0003 -0.83 
W*Banking services  -0.002
** 
-3.53 -0.0019
**
 -3.56 
W*Tap drinking water  -0.0003
 
-1.32 -0.0004 -1.78 
ρ 1 , ρ2 0.096
* 10.48 0.094* 10.10 
*Indicates the coeff icient is signif icant at a 2.5 per cent level, and ** indicates the coeff icient is signif icant at a 1 per cent 
level. ª On the basis of 61st Round of National Sample Survey conducted in 2004/05. b Figures for 1999. 
!  
W is the w eighting matrix. 
 
 
 
 22 
 
Table 4: Comparative Statics for Bangalore Urban  
 
   Factories Electrification 
Closed 
drainage 
School 
enrollment Banks 
Drinking 
water 
Bangalore 
Urban 0.18 0.30 0.41 0.25 0.17 0.27 
Dharmapuri 0.03 0.06 0.09 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 
Bangalore 
Rural 0.03 0.06 0.08 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 
Chamarajanag
ar 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
Kolar 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
Salem 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Erode 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Tumkur 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Mandya 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Viluppuram 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Tiruvanamala 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Vellore 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Table 5: Impact of Closed Drainage and Drinking Water on Median Income 
Log Income 2001/02 Direct Own Effect Direct Neighborhood Effect Indirect Neighborhood  Effect 
Closed drainage 1.39 0.59 0.79 
Drinking water  0.21 0.09 0.12 
Log Income 2004/05 Direct Own Effect Direct Neighborhood Effect Indirect Neighborhood  Effect 
Closed drainage 1.02 0.47 0.54 
Drinking water  0.23 0.11 0.12 
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Figure 1: Median adjusted densities and distribution of district-level log-income in 
1999/2000, 2001/02, and 2004/05. 
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Figure 2.1: Percentage change in income due to 1% growth in closed drainage in 2001/02 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Percentage change in income due to 1% growth in tap drinking water source 
within premises in 2001/02. 
 
 
 
